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Abstract
We explore patterns of price competition in an oligopoly where consumers vary in
the set of rms they consider for their purchase and buy from the lowest-priced rm
they consider. We study a pattern of consideration, termed symmetric interactions,
that generalises models used in existing work (duopoly, symmetric rms, and rms
with independent reach). Within this class, equilibrium prots are proportional to
a rms reach, rms with a larger reach set higher average prices, and a reduction
in the number of rms (either by exit or by merger) harms consumers. We go on
to study patterns of consideration with asymmetric interactions. In situations with
disjoint reach and with nested reach we nd equilibria in which price competition
is duopolistic: only two rms compete within each price range. We characterize
equilibria in the three-rm case, and show how entry and merger can a¤ect patterns
of price competition in novel ways.
Keywords: Price competition, consideration sets, mixed strategies, entry and merger.
1 Introduction
We study oligopoly pricing in a setting where consumers di¤er in the set of rms they
consider for their purchase, and who buy from the rm in their consideration set with
the lowest price. Bertrand equilibrium then typically involves rms choosing their prices
according to mixed strategies, and a rm chooses from a range of prices. The pattern of
price competition could take many forms. Firms might all choose from a similar range of
prices, or competition might be more segmented with only a small subset of rms competing
at a given price. Who competes with whom at each price is determined in equilibrium.
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to Daisuke Hirata, Maarten Janssen, Jon Levin, Domenico Menicucci, Vlad Nora, Martin Obradovits,
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How does the equilibrium pattern of price competition depend on the underlying pattern
of consumer consideration?
The simplest situation in which this question arises is a duopoly in which each rm has
some captive customers, while contested customers are able to pay the lower of the two
rms prices. A rm then has choice between ghting, by competing against its rival
for the contested consumer segment with a low price, or retreating towards its captive
base by setting a high price, and in equilibrium these strategies yield the same prot.
Even if the rms are asymmetric, they use the same interval range of prices. With more
than two rms, though, richer patterns of consumer consideration become possible. Taking
the interaction between two rms to be the overlap in the sets of consumers who consider
buying from them relative to their reaches, di¤erent pairs of rms might have very di¤erent
levels of interaction. With more than one rival a rm can compete on several fronts, and
richer patterns of pricing also emerge. With a segmented pricing pattern, for instance, a
rm might compete against one rm when it charges a low price and another rm when it
charges a higher price.
The foundation of our model is the distribution of consideration sets among consumers.
There are various reasons why di¤erent consumers have di¤erent sets of choices open to
them. Perhaps following a prior stage of advertising by rms, some consumers become
aware of a di¤erent set of suppliers than other consumers. For instance, Draganska and
Klapper (2011) document limited and heterogeneous consumer awareness of various brands
of ground co¤ee, while Honka, Hortacsu, and Vitorino (2017) do the same for retail banks.
Likewise, consumers have di¤erent propensities to search (some consumers only obtain
one price quote for a mortgage, some obtain two, and so on), and this leads to di¤erent
degrees of consumer awareness. Personalised online search tools might mean that di¤erent
consumers see di¤erent results even when using the same search terms. As in Spiegler
(2006), there might be (extreme) horizontal product di¤erentiation such that only a subset
of products meet a consumers needs. Some consumers might be constrained in their choices
by transport costs. For instance, some models of spatial competition, such as Smith (2004),
suppose that a consumer considers buying from those rms located within a specied radius
of her. Consumers might also di¤er in their ability to make comparisons between o¤ers,
with confused consumers choosing randomly between suppliers or buying from a default
seller (Piccione and Spiegler (2012), Chioveanu and Zhou (2013)). Our analysis does not
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take a view on the underlying reason why consumers have di¤erent consideration sets.
Rather, it takes the distribution of consideration sets in the consumer population as given,
and explores the consequences for competition.
A considerable literature has explored instances of this general framework, and some
patterns of consideration are now well understood: (a) the case with symmetric rms; (b)
the case with independent reach, and (c) the one-or-all case where consumers are either
captive to one rm or can choose between all rms. Within case (a), which covers the great
majority of existing models, Rosenthal (1980) and Varian (1980) considered the situation
in which some consumers are randomly captive to particular rms, while others compare
the prices of all rms and buy from the cheapest. (Thus these papers also fall under case
(c).) Burdett and Judd (1983, section 3.3) analyze a more general symmetric model, in
which arbitrary fractions of consumers consider one random rm, two random rms, and
so on. In this framework there exists a symmetric equilibrium, and Johnen and Ronayne
(2019) show that this symmetric equilibrium is the unique equilibrium if and only if there
are some consumers who consider precisely two rms. Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris
(2020) extend Burdett and Judds model so that rms might have information about the
number of rms a consumer considers. This information might be public, so all rms see
the same information about a consumer, or di¤erent rms might have di¤erent information,
and the authors derive the information structure which maximizes industry prot.
In case (b) with independent reach, the fact that a consumer considers a given rm
does not a¤ect the likelihood she considers any other rm. Then the rm that reaches the
most consumers also has the largest proportion of captive consumers among the consumers
within its reachi.e., it has the highest captive-to-reach ratio. This model was studied by
Ireland (1993) and McAfee (1994), who show that in equilibrium all rms use the same
minimum price, but the maximum price charged is lower for rms with a smaller reach.
Thus price supports are nested, so that smaller-reach rms only o¤er low prices while more
ubiquitous rms o¤er the full range of prices. Since rms use the same minimum price,
their prots are proportional to their reach.1
Case (c), where consumers either consider just one rm or consider the entire set of
rms, was fully solved by Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (1992). (This framework includes
1This equilibrium was subsequently shown by Szech (2011) to be unique. Spiegler (2006) studies
the special case of this framework where all rms are equally likely to be considered (which therefore
also ts into case (a) with symmetric rms). In an empirical study of the personal computer market,
Sovinsky Goeree (2008) assumes that the reach of the various products is independent.
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duopoly as a special case, which was studied by Narasimhan (1988).) In the symmetric
version of the model (which coincides with the models of Varian and Rosenthal), when
there are more than two rms many asymmetric equilibria exist alongside the symmetric
equilibrium. With asymmetry, when rms have di¤erent numbers of captive customers,
all but the two smallest rms choose the monopoly price for sure, while the two smallest
rms compete using mixed strategies. Intuitively, the two rms with the fewest captive
customers have the strongest incentive to ght, leaving rms with more captives with an
incentive to retreat to their captive base. This is an extreme instance of the situation
where some rms choose only high prices, which we discuss further in the following.
While these three special cases are natural benchmarks, in practice patterns of con-
sumer consideration will fall outside these cases. For example, in their study of ground
co¤ee Draganska and Klapper (2011) document in their sample that rms are not close
to being symmetric, that consumer awareness is far from independent across brands, and
that the consideration sets of many consumers consisted neither of a single rm nor of
the whole set of rms. The aim of the present paper is to provide a unifying framework
which encompasses patterns (a) to (c) as special cases, but which allows us to study richer
situations outside these cases as well, and to discover new types of equilibrium interaction.
The analysis is organized as follows. In section 2 we present our general framework of
consideration sets, and formalize the notion of interaction between sets of rms which
captures the relevant measure of correlation between the reaches of rms. In section 3 we
introduce a pattern of consumer consideration, which we term symmetric interactions,
which includes (a) to (c) as special cases. With symmetric interactions, the probability
that a consumer considers rm i given that she considers rm j does not depend on the
identity of j. In this case the unique equilibrium pattern of prices resembles that seen with
independent reach, i.e., there is an increasing sequence of prices fpig, and the rm with
the ith smallest reach uses prices in the interval [p0; pi]. In particular, all rms use the
same minimum price p0, prots are proportional to a rms reach, and rms with a larger
reach stochastically choose higher prices. When the set of rms is reduced, either by exit
or by merger, the prots of remaining rms rise and consumers overall are harmed.
In the remainder of the paper we study patterns of consideration beyond symmetric
interactions. In section 4 we analyse two situationsdisjoint reach and nested reach
which are sure to have asymmetric interactions. To illustrate which might happen with
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disjoint reach we discuss competition between a chain store and a number of disjoint
local rivals. In this case, the chain store uses prices from the whole market range, [p0; 1],
and di¤erent local rms choose their prices from disjoint intervals within [p0; 1] (where
local rms with greater interaction with the chain store use lower prices). Thus there
is duopolistic price competition, and the chain store competes against a single rival
at a given price. With nested reach, only the rm with the largest reach has any captive
customers, and rms with larger reach chooses prices from a higher range. If the increments
between successive rm reaches are non-decreasing we nd equilibria with a di¤erent form of
duopolistic pricing which we term overlapping duopoly: there is an increasing sequence
of prices fpig such that the rm with the ith smallest reach uses prices in the interval
[pi 1; pi+1]. Hence small rms charge only low prices while large rms charge only high
prices, and rms compete only against their immediate neighbours in the nest.
In section 5 we provide a general analysis of the three-rm case. When interactions
between pairs of rms are similar, as in section 3, all rms use a common lowest price.
In some of these cases, however, we nd that the price support of the least competitive
rm need not be an intervalthe rm might price high or low but not in an intermediate
range. By contrast, when one pair of rms has signicantly more interaction than other
pairs, the equilibrium exhibits the duopolistic pricing seen in section 4one rm prices
low, one high, and one across the full price range. Intuitively, this pair mostly compete
with each other, leaving the remaining rm with an incentive to set high prices. While
entry into a duopoly market by a third rm often pushes down prices, there are natural
patterns of interaction where, counter-intuitively, the opposite happens and consumers are
harmed by entry. The reason is that more intense competition for contestable consumers
induces incumbents to retreat towards their captive base. While a protable merger in
a three-rm market will always harm consumers (as with symmetric interactions), there
are situations where a protable merger between two rms with a strong interaction can
reduce industry prot. The reason is that such a merger opens up a protable front for
the non-merging rms, and induces these rms to ght rather than retreat.
We conclude in section 6 by summarizing the main insights derived from our analysis,
and suggesting avenues for further research on this topic.
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2 A model with consideration sets
There are n  2 rms that costlessly supply a homogeneous product. There is a population
of consumers of total measure normalized to 1, each of whom has unit demand and is willing
to pay up to 1 for a unit of the product.2 Consumers di¤er according to which rms they
consider for their purchase, and for each subset S  N  f1; :::; ng of rms the fraction of
consumers who consider exactly the subset S is S. (We slightly abuse notation, and write
1 for the fraction who consider only rm 1, 12 = 21 for the fraction who consider only
rms 1 and 2, and so on.) When there are only few rms the pattern of consideration sets
can be illustrated using a Venn diagram, and Figure 1 depicts a market with three rms.3
Here, a consumer considers a particular subset of rms if she lies inside the circle of each
of those rms. For instance, a fraction 12 of consumers consider the two rms 1 and 2.
A consumer is captive to rm i if she considers i but no other other rm, so there are i
such consumers.
It is also useful also to write S for the fraction of consumers who consider all rms in
S  N , and possibly other rms too. (Formally S =
P
S0jSS0 S0 , so that with the three
rms on Figure 1 we have 12 = 12 + 123, say.) Thus S  S, with equality for S = N ,
and S weakly decreases with S in the set-theoretic sense. The reach of rm i is the set of
consumers who consider the rm, i.e., the rms potential customers, and the fraction of
such consumers is i. Finally, the captive-to-reach ratio of rm i is denoted i  i=i.
Firms compete in a one-shot Bertrand manner, and a consumer buys from the rm she
considers that has the lowest price (provided this price is no greater than 1). In particular,
a rm o¤ers a uniform price to consumers, and cannot make its price to a consumer
contingent on her consideration set.4 Thus if a rm sets a price strictly below all its rivals
it sells to its reach and its demand is i, while if it sets a price strictly above all rivals
it sells only to its captive customers and its demand is i. If two or more rms choose
the same lowest price, we suppose that the consumer is equally likely to buy from any
2The equilibrium analysis which follows is not a¤ected if each consumer has a downward-sloping demand
function x(p), provided revenue px(p) is an increasing function up to the monopoly price. However, welfare
analysis (e.g., in our discussion of mergers and entry) requires adjustment with downward-sloping demand.
3In a spatial context this Venn diagram has a more literal interpretation: if consumers only consider
buying from a rm within a specied distance, then the locations of rms determine the centre of the
circles on the diagram. In a very di¤erent context, Prat (2018) uses a model of consideration sets similar
to that presented in this paper.
4In Armstrong and Vickers (2019) we investigate the impact of rms being able to o¤er di¤erent prices
to captive and contested customers.
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such rm (although the details of the tie-breaking rule make no di¤erence to the analysis).
Since industry prot is a continuous function of the vector of prices chosen, Theorem 5 in
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) shows that an equilibrium exists. Since an individual rms
prot is usually discontinuous in the price vector, the equilibrium will usually involve mixed
strategies for some rms.
Figure 1: Consideration sets with three rms
We make two running assumptions to rule out some extreme and uninteresting cong-
urations. The rst requires that there be some competition between rms:
Assumption 1: Some consumers consider at least two rms.
(If all customers were captive, each rm chooses p  1 for sure.) The second assumption
prohibits the possibility that a subset of rms choose the competitive price p  0 for sure,
as such rms play no important role in the analysis:
Assumption 2: Every non-empty subset of rms S contains at least one rm with con-
sumers within its reach who consider no other rm in S.
For instance, this assumption rules out the situation where two rms reach precisely the
same set of consumers. Intuitively, Assumption 2 ensures that no subset S of rms will
set p  0, since there is a rm in S which has some customers with no overlap with other
rms in S, and this rm can protably raise its price above zero. These two assumptions
together imply that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. As well as these two running
assumptions, we sometimes make use of a third assumption:
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Assumption 3: ij > 0 for all i and j.
This assumption states that each pair of rms has some mutually contested customers,
regardless of the prices chosen by other rms. The assumption is satised with independent
reach, but with more than two rms it rules out the all-or-one pattern of consideration.
Suppose that rm j 2 N chooses its price (independently) according to the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) Fj(p). These strategies then induce a demand function qi(p)
for rm i, which is the expected fraction of consumers who buy its product when it chooses
price p. (We present explicit formulas for this demand shortly.) Equilibrium occurs when
for each rm i there exists a prot level i and a CDF Fi(p) for its price with such that
rm is expected prot pqi(p) is equal to i for every price in the support of Fi and no
higher than i for any price outside its support.
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It is also useful to introduce the notation qij(p), which is the probability that a consumer
considers both rms i and j and that any other rm she considers has price at least p.
This represents the fraction of consumers contested by these two rms at price p, i.e., the
increase in its demand if rm i slightly undercuts rm j at price p. (Just as the regular
demand function qi satises i  qi(p)  i, here we have ij  qij(p)  ij.) Using
this notation, say that in equilibrium rms i and j compete at price p if p lies in both
rms price supports and qij(p) > 0. If the two rms have disjoint reach then they do not
compete even if they happen to use the same price. However, if Assumption 3 holds then
qij(p) is always positive, in which case rm i competes with j at p whenever the price lies
in both supports.
The following result collects a number of preliminary observations about the structure
of price competition in equilibrium, some of which are familiar from the existing literature.6
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium:
(i) rm i obtains prot i  i, with equality for at least one rm, and the minimum price
in its support is no smaller than i;
(ii) the minimum price ever chosen in the market, p0, is strictly positive, and rm i obtains
prot i  ip0;
(iii) each rms price distribution is continuous (that is, has no atoms) in the half-open
interval [p0; 1);
5As usual, the support of rm is price distribution is dened to be the smallest closed set P  [0; 1]
such that the probability the rm chooses a price in P equals one.
6For instance, see McAfee (1994, page 28).
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(iv) at least two rms compete at each price in the interval [p0; 1];
(v) if there are three or more rms, there is at least one price which lies in the support of
three or more rms, and
(vi) p0 lies weakly between the second lowest i and the highest i. If the rm with the
highest i has p0 in its support then p0 is equal to the highest i.
Proof. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
Part (iii) of the lemma shows that ties do not occur with positive probability at any
price p < 1. Moreover, there cannot be ties with positive probability even at p = 1
between rms which compete at this price.7 When rm i chooses price p  1 it will sell
to a consumer when that consumer is within its reach and when none of the other rms
the consumer considers o¤ers a lower price. Therefore, when rival rms k 6= i choose price
according to the CDF Fk(p), rm is expected demand with price p is
qi(p) 
X
Sji2S
S
0
@Y
k2S=i
(1  Fk(p))
1
A : (1)
Here, the sum is over all consumer segments which consider rm i, and for each such
segment the product is over all rivals for rm i in that segment. (We use the convention
that a product taken over the empty set, i.e., when S = fig in (1), equals 1.) For a given
rival rm j, rm is demand (1) can be decomposed as
qi(p) = qi=j(p)  Fj(p)qij(p) ; (2)
where qi=j(p) is rm is demand in the hypothetical situation where rm j is absent, which
is
qi=j(p) =
X
Sji;j2S

S + S=j
0@ Y
k2S=fi;kg
(1  Fk(p))
1
A ; (3)
while qij(p) is the overlap demand previously discussed, which is
qij(p) 
X
Sji;j2S
S
0
@ Y
k2S=fi;jg
(1  Fk(p))
1
A : (4)
7If qij(1) > 0 then each of them obtains a discrete jump in demand if it reduces its price slightly from
1, which cannot occur in equilibrium. So the only way both can have an atom is if qij(1) = 0, in which
case a rms demand is not a¤ected if its rival slightly undercuts it at p = 1.
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It is often more convenient to express a rms demand in terms of the S rather than
then S parameters, and demand (1) can be re-written as
qi(p) =
X
Sji2S
( 1)jSj 1S
0
@Y
k2S=i
Fk(p)
1
A : (5)
Here, ( 1)jSj 1 is plus or minus 1 according to whether i has an even or odd number of
rivals. The equivalence of the expressions (1) and (5) can be seen by comparing terms:
for each subset S containing rm i the term k2S=iFk appears in (1) for each set S 0 such
that S  S 0  N , and each time with the same sign ( 1)jSj 1, and so has total weight
( 1)jSj 1S in (1), just as in (5).
Finally, expression (5) can be re-written as
qi(p)
i
=
X
Sji2S
( 1)jSj 1S
0
@Y
k2S=i
Gk(p)
1
A ; (6)
where we dene
Gi(p)  iFi(p)
and
S 
S
i2Si
: (7)
Thus, Gi(p) is the probability a consumer considers rm i and is o¤ered a price below p
from that rm. We say that S is the interaction between rms in the subset S  N . These
interaction parameters play a major role in the following analysis, and capture patterns of
correlation (or commonality) in the reaches of subsets of rms.8 Clearly, i  1. The
reaches of two rms i and j are positively correlated if ij  ij, i.e., if ij  1, while
if two rms have disjoint reach then ij = 0. From this perspective, patterns of consumer
consideration are determined by rm reaches, i, and the way these reaches overlap as
captured by the interaction parameters, S.
The patterns of consideration which have been examined in the existing literature,
discussed in the introduction, can be interpreted using this notation. With symmetric
rms, each of the parameters S, S and S depend only on the number of rms in S, not
their identity. With independent reach, where a consumer considers rm i with independent
8This representation of the correlation structure of multiple binary random variables is in the spirit of
Bahadur (1961), although the details of correlation measures di¤er.
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probability i, we have
S = (i2Si)(j =2S(1  j)) ; S = i2Si ; S  1 :
In this case (6) factorizes to
qi(p)
i
=
Y
k2N=i
(1 Gk(p)) : (8)
With all-or-one consideration, N > 0 consumers consider all n rms and i consumers
consider only rm i, so the reach of rm i is i = N + i and S = N whenever S
includes more than a single rm. The pair of rms consisting of the two smallest rms has
the greatest pairwise interaction term ij. With duopoly, demand in (6) satises
qi(p)
i
= 1  12Gj(p) ; (9)
while with three rms demand (6) satises
qi(p)
i
= 1  ijGj(p)  ikGk(p) + 123Gj(p)Gk(p) : (10)
At various points in the remainder of the paper we will discuss the impact of entry,
exit and mergers on outcomes. We model entry by a new rm as the introduction of
a new circle superimposed onto the existing Venn diagram. That is, entry does not
a¤ect which consumers consider which incumbent rms, and the reach of an incumbent
rm is una¤ected by entry, although its number of captive customers will weakly fall.9
More generally, entry does not alter the interaction parameters S in (7) between sets of
incumbents. Since welfareconsumer surplus plus industry protis the total number
of consumers reached, it follows that entry (if it is costless) will increase welfare by the
number of captive customers of the entrant. For this reason, if entry reduces industry prot
it will benet consumers. Since the entrants contribution to welfare (its captive base) is a
lower bound on its prot, the external impact of entry on incumbent prot plus consumer
surplus is weakly negative. Exit by a rm is just the removal of a circle, and leaves the
interactions S between the remaining rms unchanged, and weakly reduces welfare. If
exit increases industry prot, it will harm consumers.
Mergers also have a natural set-theoretic interpretation in this framework: when two or
more rms merge we assume that the merged entity sets the same price to all its customers,
9In particular, there is no danger of choice overload, whereby the number of consumers who compare
prices falls when there are more rms, as discussed for instance in Spiegler (2011, page 150).
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and that the reach of the merged entity is the union of the reaches of the separate rms.10
Thus, a merger (with no accompanying cost synergies) has no impact on welfare, and harms
consumers if and only if it increases industry prot. The fraction of consumers reached by
the merged rm, which is i + j   ij, is no greater than the sum of those reached by
the separate rms, i + j, while the captive base of the merged rm, i + j + ij, is no
smaller than the sum of captives of the separate rms, i + j. A merger does not alter
the interactions S between sets of non-merging rms.
3 Symmetric interactions
In this section we suppose that interactions between sets of rms in (7) are symmetric, in the
sense that S depends only on the number, not the identity, of rms in S. The familiar cases
of symmetric rms, independent reach and duopoly all fall within this more general class
of consideration structures. In essence, this class combines the exibility of the symmetric
rm framework, which is to be able to choose the distribution of number of considered rms
freely, with the exibility of the independent reach framework, which allows for asymmetric
rms where rm reaches can be chosen freely.11 The class of symmetric interactions rules
out richer patterns of consideration, however, such as where reach is nested, where some
rms have disjoint reach, or where some pairs of rms have reach which is positively
correlated and some where reach is negatively correlated.
One natural environment in which interactions are symmetric is when consumers di¤er
systematically in attentiveness. Suppose that rm i sends a message to a consumer with
probability ~i (independent across rms), and that a consumer with attentiveness  receives
such a message (given it has been sent to her) with probability  (independent across all
messages sent to her).12 Then a type- consumer considers rm i with probability ~i,
considers both rms i and j with probability 2~i~j, and so on. In this situation there
is positive correlation in reaches across rms, since if a consumer considers rm i she is
10An alternative approach would be for the merged entity to maintain separate brands and to be able
to charge distinct prices for each brand.
11To illustrate, when there are three rms as on Figure 1, patterns of consumer consideration are de-
scribed by seven parameters (the number of segments in the Venn diagram). If interactions are constrained
to be symmetric the three pairwise interactions ij must be equal, and so two degrees of freedom are lost
leaving ve degrees of freedom remaining (the three reaches plus the pairwise interaction and the three-rm
interaction). The cases of symmetric rms and independent reach each have only three degrees of freedom.
12For instance,  might capture how much media, across which marketing messages are delivered, the
consumer chooses to see.
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likely to have a high  and hence is more likely to consider rm j too. Integrating over the
distribution of  in the consumer population shows that we have
S =
E[i2S(~i)]
i2S(E[~i])
=
E[
jSj]
(E[])
jSj ;
which depends only on the cardinality of S. (In this case the interaction terms are all
greater than 1.)
This assumption of symmetric interactions implies that the probability a consumer
considers rm i given that she considers a second rm j (which is iij) does not depend
on the identity of j. Further useful implications of the assumption are reported in the
following result.
Lemma 2 Suppose interactions are symmetric. Then for any pair of rms i and j the
demand functions in (6) satisfy
qi(p)
i
 
qj(p)
j
=
qij(p)
ij
[Gi(p) Gj(p)] ; (11)
and captive-to-reach ratios satisfy
i   j =
ij
ij
[i   j] : (12)
Recall that qij(p) is dened in (4), and if qij(p) is positive, which is ensured by As-
sumption 3, then qi=i   qj=j has the same sign as Gi  Gj. Likewise, with Assumption
3 expression (12) implies i > j if and only if i > j, and so a rm with a larger reach
has a higher captive-to-reach ratio.
Expression (11) almost immediately implies our main result concerning symmetric in-
teractions, which is that in equilibrium all rms use the same minimum price, p0. For if
not, there is a strict subset A of rms with the market minimum price p0 in their support,
and let rm i be the rm outside A with the next lowest minimum price, L > p0. Any
rm j 2 A weakly prefers price p0 (when it serves its entire reach) to the price L, so that
qj(P )=j  p0=L. Firm i, by contrast, weakly prefers L to p0, and so qi(P )=i  p0=L. In
particular, qi(L)=i  qj(L)=j. But since Gj(L) > 0 and Gi(L) = 0, this contradicts (11)
provided that qij(L) > 0. We deduce that in equilibrium all rms must have the same min-
imum price p0, which from part (vi) of Lemma 1 is therefore the highest captive-to-reach
ratio among the rms. As discussed above, this is the captive-to-reach ratio of the rm
with the greatest reach. The next result provides further detail about the pricing pattern
in equilibrium:
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Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 3 holds and interactions are symmetric. Suppose
rms are labelled in order of increasing reach, so that 1  :::  n. Then in the unique
equilibrium rm i has interval price support [p0; pi], where the minimum price p0 is equal
to the captive-to-reach ratio of the rm with the largest reach (rm n) and maximum prices
satisfy p1  :::  pn 1 = pn = 1. Firms with larger reach set stochastically higher prices, in
the sense that F1(p)  :::  Fn(p) for p 2 [p0; 1]. Firm i obtains expected prot i = ip0.
This result shows that with symmetric interactions the equilibrium pricing pattern takes
the same form as with independent reach: all rms have the same minimum price and rms
with smaller reach have a lower maximum price, so that price supports are nested. When
a rm chooses a higher price from its support, it competes against fewer rivals. The role of
Assumption 3 is as in Johnen and Ronayne (2019): if some pairs of rms have no unique
consumers in common, the possibility arises that other equilibria exist where some rms
price deterministically at p = 1.
Markets with symmetric interactions exhibit intuitive properties when the number of
rms is reduced, either by exit or by merger. If a rm exits a market with symmetric
interactions, then the rms that remain continue to have symmetric interactions and hence
all use the same minimum price. This new minimum price will necessarily be higher than
before exit. If two rms merge in a market with symmetric interactions, the new market
does not necessarily continue to have symmetric interactions, although if the merger is
protable the minimum price will rise. In either case, the following result shows that
consumers overall are harmed.
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption 3 holds and interactions are symmetric. Then:
(i) If a rm exits the minimum price rises and consumer surplus falls;
(ii) If two rms merge protably the minimum price rises and consumer surplus falls.
In the remainder of the paper we study in more detail situations outside the regular
case of symmetric interactions, and show how the form of equilibrium can di¤er markedly.
As well as nding situations where only a subset of rms use the minimum price, we will
also see instances where a rm has a gap in its price support. In contrast to Proposition
2, we will nd situations where exit by a rm or a protable merger between rms can
increase consumer surplus.
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4 Asymmetric interactions
In this section we discuss equilibrium pricing patterns when consumer consideration in-
volves asymmetric interactions. We will focus especially on markets where some rms have
disjoint reach or where rms have nested reach.
Proposition 1 provided a su¢cient condition for all rms to use the same minimum price.
A su¢cient condition for the converse, i.e., for only a subset of rms to use the minimum
price, can also be derived. If all rms have the minimum price p0 in their support, then
qi(p)=i = p0=p for prices just above p0, and so q
0
i(p0)=i =  1=p0 for each rm i. From
(6), this entails
P
j 6=i ijG
0
j(p0) = 1=p0 for each rm i. If this system of linear equations in
G01(p0),...,G
0
n(p0) has no solution with each G
0
i(p0)  0, there can be no equilibrium where
all rms use the same minimum price p0. Farkas Lemma implies that there is no such
solution if and only if there exists a vector (x1; :::; xn) that satises
nX
j=1
xj < 0 and
X
j 6=i
ijxj  0 for all i : (13)
Thus, when the pairwise interactions are such that we can nd a vector (x1; :::; xn) satisfying
(13) then any equilibrium has only a subset of rms using the minimum price p0. (Note that
condition (13) does not depend on the behaviour of S for larger subsets S.) To illustrate
the method for n = 3, suppose interactions are so asymmetric that 12 > 13 + 23.
Then setting (x1; x2; x3) = (23; 13; 12) satises (13), and so only two rms will use the
minimum price. (In section 5 we will see that it is rms 1 and 2 which price low.)
A similar method can be employed to show that a given subset of rms cannot use the
minimum price p0 in equilibrium. We shortly do this in the case of nested reach to show
when only a small number of rms will price low.
Chain store competition: An economically natural scenario with disjoint reach is when a
chain store, rm n, competes against n  1  2 disjoint local rivals (so there are n  3
rms in all), as shown in Figure 2 when n = 5. With this pattern of consideration, S = 0
for every S which contains two or more local rms. Lemma 1 shows that at least two
rms compete at each price in the market range of prices [p0; 1]. Since local rms do not
compete between themselves, this implies that the chain store chooses its price from the
whole range [p0; 1] and each price in [p0; 1] is also chosen by at least one local rm.
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Figure 2: A chain store competing against disjoint local rivals
As in (9), the demand of local rm i is qi(p) = i(1   inGn(p)), where in is the
pairwise interaction term for i and n, and Gn(p) = nFn(p) is the chain stores adjusted
CDF. To avoid knife-edge cases suppose local rms have distinct interaction terms, and
label them as 1n > ::: > n 1;n. Suppose local rm i has price pi in its support, and
another local rm j has price pj in its support. By revealed preference
pi(1  inGn(pi))  pj(1  inGn(pj)) ; pj(1  jnGn(pj))  pi(1  jnGn(pi)) ;
and subtracting yields
(jn   in)[piGn(pi)  pjGn(pj)]  0 :
Since pGn(p) is a strictly increasing function, it follows that rms with larger i (i.e., with a
weaker interaction with n) choose weakly higher prices. Moreover, if both rms have both
the prices pi and pj in their supports the argument shows that
(jn   in)[piGn(pi)  pjGn(pj)] = 0 ;
which implies pi = pj. Therefore, there can be no overlap beyond a single price in the price
supports of two local rms.
In economic terms, the local rms all compete against the same price distribution from
the chain store, and local rms with greater interaction with the chain store have more
elastic demand and so o¤er lower prices. In technical terms, the only way that a single
price distribution from the chain store can maintain indi¤erence for each local rival is for
di¤erent rivals to have disjoint price supports.
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Putting this together yields the following result. (Note that we have weak inequalities
in p0 < p1  :::  pn 1 = 1 since it is possible that a number of local rms, but not all,
choose the monopoly price p = 1 for sure.)
Proposition 3 Suppose a chain store, rm n, competes with a number of local rivals,
i = 1; :::; n   1, where 1n > ::: > n 1;n. Then in equilibrium there are threshold prices
p0 < p1  :::  pn 1 = 1 such that the chain store has price support [p0; 1] and local rm
i < n has price support [pi 1; pi].
Thus with this pattern of consideration, the chain store which interacts with all local
rms uses all prices while rms with disjoint reach use disjoint sets of prices. This is
therefore a situation where the pattern of consumer consideration leads very directly to
the equilibrium pattern of price competition. In contrast to the pricing pattern with
symmetric interactions in Proposition 1, here price competition is duopolistic, in the
sense that only two rms use a given price range.13 As will be seen later in section 5, this
chain store pattern of prices can arise in equilibrium even when no rms have disjoint
reach.
Figure 3: Three rms with nested reach
Nested reach: A second situation which involve asymmetric interactions is when considera-
tion sets are nested, in the sense that if rm i reaches a greater fraction of consumers than
rm j, then all consumers reached by j also consider rm i. This is a natural congura-
tion if consumers consider options in an ordered fashion, as may be the case with internet
13With the exception of the threshold prices p1; :::; pn 2, which are in the support of three rms.
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search results (where some consumers just consider the rst result, others consider the
rst two, and so on). With nested reach, only the largest rm has any captive customers,
S = mini2Sfig, and pairwise interactions are ij = 1=maxfi; jg.
Suppose there are n  3 rms with nested reach. Let rm i have reach i, where rms
are labelled as 1 < 2 < ::: < n, and for i  2 write i = i   i 1 for the incremental
reach of rm i. (Figure 3 depicts the case with three nested rms.) While it is hard
to calculate the precise equilibrium in all nested situations, the following result describes
general features of equilibrium pricing and also derives an equilibrium in the particular
case where where incremental reach is larger for larger rms.
Proposition 4 Suppose n  3 rms, labelled as 1 < 2 < ::: < n, have nested reach.
(i) If Li and Hi are respectively the minimum and maximum price in rm is support then
p0 = L1 = L2  L3  :::  Ln, H1 < H2 < ::: < Hn 1 = Hn = 1, and Hi > Li+1 for i < n.
(ii) If k > 22 then no rm i  k uses the minimum price p0 (i.e., Lk > p0).
(iii) If
2  :::  n (14)
there is an equilibrium with price thresholds p0 = p1 < p2 < ::: < pn 1 < pn = pn+1 = 1
such that the price support of rm i is [pi 1; pi+1]. The thresholds are determined recursively
by p2 =
1+2
2
p1 and for 1 < i < n
pi+1 = pi +
i
i+1
pi 1 ; (15)
where p0 = p1 is chosen to make pn = 1. The prot of rm 1 is 1 = 1p1 and the prot
of rm i > 1 is i = ipi.
In part (i), the reason that a smaller rm will not choose a price strictly above the
maximum price used by a larger rm is that will then have no demand or prot. The
observation that minimum prices weakly increase with size is less immediate, but relates
to the intuition that smaller rms face more elastic demand. The implication is that if
only a subset of rms use the minimum price p0 that subset will consist of the smaller
rms. Since Hi > Li+1 the price supports of successive rms overlap. Part (ii) shows that
if reaches are spread out then only few rms will price low. In particular, if 3 > 22 then
only the two smallest rms will price low. Together, parts (i) and (ii) shows that if reaches
are spread out then the pricing pattern is such that smaller rms only choose low prices
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while larger rms only choose high prices. Finally, part (iii) shows that if the reaches are
spread out enough that (14) holds, then as with the chain store scenario price competition
is duopolistic, with only two rms competing at a given price. More precisely, the pricing
pattern takes the form of overlapping duopolies, where a rm only competes against its
two immediate neighbours in the nest.14
To illustrate part (iii), consider the case where reach decays with a constant rate of
attrition, so that the reach of rm i = 1; :::; n is i = 
n i. In this case i = 
n i(1   )
which increases with i as required, and equation (15) becomes pi+1 = pi + pi 1. When
n = 2 the two rms have reaches 1 =  and 2 = 1, and Proposition 1 shows that the
minimum price is 1  and industry prot is 1 2. Proposition 4 can be used to obtain the
equilibrium for any n. However, the analysis simplies in the limit with many rms, when
one can show that the threshold prices are given by the geometric progression ; 2; :::,
where  = 2
1+
p
1+4
 1, and the minimum price p0 converges to zero. Industry prot is
(1   )(1 +  + ()2 + :::) = 1 
1  . Perhaps surprisingly, this prot with many rms is
higher than that with two rms, 1   2, even though the set of consumers served is the
same. Put another way, exit by all but the two largest rms causes industry prot to fall.
Since welfare is unchanged after exit, it follows that exit benets consumers in aggregate,
in contrast to Proposition 2. We discuss how entry can harm consumers further in the
next section, using a more transparent framework with symmetric incumbents.
Proposition 4 describes the precise equilibrium only for cases where incremental reach
weakly increases. In the next section we analyse the case of triopoly, and obtain results
implying for the case of nested reach that (a) when 3 > 2 the equilibrium in part (iii) of
Proposition 4 is unique and (b) when 3 < 2 the equilibrium instead has all three rms
using the same minimum price.
5 The three-rm problem
So far we have encountered two contrasting patterns of pricing: (i) all rms use the same
minimum price (the case of symmetric interactions in section 3), and (ii) duopolistic pricing
14A similar pattern of overlapping duopoly pricing is seen in Bulow and Levin (2006). They study
a matching model where n heterogeneous rms each wish to hire a single worker from a pool with n
heterogeneous workers, where the payo¤ from a match is (in the simplest version of their model) the
product of qualities of the rm and worker. In equilibrium, rms o¤er wages according to mixed strategies,
where higher quality rms o¤er wages in a higher range than lower quality rms.
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where only two rms use prices in a given price range (cases of disjoint and nested reach
in section 4). In this section we study in detail the situation with three rms, and show
that the pricing patterns in (i) and (ii) are (generically) the only possibilities. That is, if
pricing is duopolistic for low prices, it continues to be duopolistic throughout the whole
price range.15
We rst describe a su¢cient condition for regime (i) to apply, using a similar argument
to that for symmetric interactions in section 3. This argument will also reveal which pair
of rms price low when regime (ii) applies. Suppose that an equilibrium has rms 1 and
2 using minimum price p0, while 3s minimum price is L > p0. Then both rms 1 and 2
have prices [p0; L] in their support, and by revealed preference
q1(L)
1
=
q2(L)
2
=
p0
L

q3(L)
3
:
From (10), demand functions for distinct rms i, j and k satisfy
qi(p)
i
 
qj(p)
j
= (jk   ik)Gk(p) + (ij   Gk(p))(Gi(p) Gj(p)) ; (16)
where for notational simplicity we have written   123. Note that the term (ij Gk(p))
is equal to qij(p)=(ij)  0, and so expression (16) reduces to (11) when interactions are
symmetric.
Since 1 and 2 compete alone in the range [p0; L), we must have 12 > 0, and since
G3(L) = 0 expression (16) with k = 3 implies G1(L) = G2(L). Applying (16) with k = 1
then implies
0  13 + 23   12   G1(L)  13 + 23   12   1 : (17)
The same argument with k = 2 in (16) shows that 0  13+23 12 2, and so if only
rms 1 and 2 use the minimum price p0 it is necessary that
minf1; 2g  13 + 23   12 : (18)
Since 13  2  minf1; 2g and 23  1  minf1; 2g, expression (18) implies
that 12  maxf13; 23g. Thus, if the equilibrium involves only two rms pricing low
those rms must have the greatest interaction among the three pairs. We deduce that if
rms are labelled so that rms 1 and 2 have the greatest interaction, then when (18) is
violated the equilibrium must have all three rms using the same minimum price.
15As discussed after Proposition 5, other possibilities arise on the knife edge between these two regimes.
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This discussion is summarized in part (i) of the following result. This result also shows
that when only two rms price low, the outcome is duopolistic pricing of the sort seen in
section 4. In particular, it cannot be an equilibrium that two rms choose prices over the
range [p0; 1] while the third rm chooses from an intermediate or upper range of prices.
Proposition 5 Suppose that rms are labelled so that rms 1 and 2 have the greatest
interaction, i.e., 12  maxf13; 23g, and that 1  2.
(i) If
1 < 13 + 23   12 (19)
then in equilibrium all rms use the same minimum price p0, which is the highest captive-
to-reach ratio among the rms;
(ii) If
1 > 13 + 23   12 (20)
then in equilibrium price competition is duopolistic: there are prices p0 < p1  1 such that
rm 1 has price support [p0; p1], rm 2 has support [p0; 1] and rm 3 has support [p1; 1].
Expressions for the thresholds p0 and p1 and for rm prots are given in the proof.
Part (i) of this result applies when interactions are similar across pairs of rms, as is the
case with symmetric interactions, so long as Assumption 3 holds so that 1 < 23 in (19).
With nested reach the two smallest rms have the strongest interaction and condition (19)
reduces to 2 > 3. Thus with three nested rms, those cases not covered by Proposition
4 have all rms using the same minimum price in equilibrium. Condition (19) implies
that 12  13 + 23, as is consistent with the discussion in section 4 showing that when
12 > 13 + 23 only two rms will price low.
Part (ii) applies when one pair of rms has signicantly stronger interaction than other
pairs. The two scenarios covered in section 4 (the chain store case and nested reach with
increasing incremental reach), which exhibit duopolistic pricing, both satisfy (20).16 If rms
1 and 2 are considered by almost the same set of consumers (so their circles on the Venn
diagram almost coincide), and if 3 > 0, then rms 1 and 2 have the greatest interaction
and condition (20) is satised, and rm 3 chooses price p  1. Intuitively, when two rms
reach nearly the same set of consumers, they compete ercely between themselves, leaving
16Although in general the chain store and the overlapping duopoly pricing patterns in section 4
di¤er, they coincide when there are three rms.
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the remaining rm to price at or near the monopoly level. Another situation where (20)
holds is the asymmetric one-or-all specication in Baye et al. (1992, Section V), where
no consumer considers exactly two rms and 1  2 < 3, when the two smallest rms 1
and 2 have the greatest interaction and rm 3 chooses p  1.
When part (ii) applies, rm 3 is sure to set a higher price than rm 1. As such, these
two rms do not compete in equilibrium, even though in general their reaches overlap. The
outcome for consumers and rms in this market is exactly the same as with an alterna-
tive pattern of consideration where consumers who previously considered f1; 3g now just
consider f1g and consumers who previous considered f1; 2; 3g now consider f1; 2g. This
alternative pattern is coarser, involving only four segments in the Venn diagram, and is
of the chain store form whereby rms 1 and 3 have disjoint reach.
In the knife-edge case where
1 = 13 + 23   12 ; (21)
which is not covered by Proposition 5, there is the possibility that both kinds of equilibrium
coexist. For instance, this is so in the symmetric Varian-type market where 12 = 13 =
23 = 0 and 1 = 2 = 3, where there is a symmetric equilibrium where all rms price
low and also asymmetric equilibria where one of the rms chooses p  1. (See Baye et al.
(1992) for the full range of equilibria in this market.) The chain store case where two local
rms are symmetric also satises (21) and has multiple equilibria.17
Equilibrium strategies when all rms use the same minimum price: Proposition 5 provides
much information about equilibria in this modelit characterizes equilibrium prot and
consumer surplus in the two regimes, and it describes equilibrium strategies when part (ii)
applies. However, it does not describe equilibrium pricing strategies for part (i), and the
equilibrium patterns of prices turn out to have interesting economic features.
Proposition 1 shows that when interactions are precisely symmetric the pricing pattern
is such that all three rms are active for low prices, and for higher prices only the two
larger rms compete. In the earlier version of this paper (Armstrong and Vickers, 2018,
Proposition 2) we calculated an equilibrium whenever part (i) of Proposition 5 applied
17Essentially, only the sum of the CDFs of the two local rms are determined in equilibrium in this
case. It is then possible that one local rm uses prices in the whole range, while the other uses prices in
an interior or upper interval, say. These knife-edge cases have a di¤erent pricing pattern from those found
generically in Proposition 5.
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(without showing if it was unique), and this took one of two forms: either (a) the three
rms were active in a lower price range and then two were active in a range of higher prices
(as with symmetric interactions), or (b) the three rms were active in a lower price range,
then only the most interactive pair continued to be active in an intermediate price range,
and then another pair of rms were active in a higher range. In particular, in situation (b)
one rm (rm 3 using the labelling in Proposition 5) chose low and high prices, but not
intermediate prices.
The general analysis was complicated, and here we merely report an example to show
the possibility. Suppose three rms have nested reach, where 1 =
1
2
, 2 =
4
5
and 3 = 1.
We show in the appendix that equilibrium with this pattern of consideration has all rms
choosing prices in the range [1
5
; 9
25
], rms 1 and 2 choosing prices in the range [ 9
25
; 16
25
] and
rms 2 and 3 choosing prices in the range [16
25
; 1].
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Figure 4: Ironing in a nested market with 1 = 1=2, 2 = 4=5, 3 = 1
The reason why the largest rm has non-convex price support can be explained as
follows. When all rms price low in equilibrium, so that part (i) of Proposition 5 applies,
one can calculate that the three CDFs increase in p for prices just above p0, the minimum
price. (The condition for the three CDFs to increase in p above p0 is no vector (x1; x2; x3)
can be found to satisfy (13), which corresponds to 12 < 13 + 23 and which is implied
by condition (19).) One can also calculate the smallest price, p1 say, at which some CDF
reaches 1 and above which the two remaining rms compete as duopolists for prices up to
1. (In the nested case, it is the smallest rms CDF which rst reaches 1, although in the
general model more detailed analysis is required to determine which rm rst drops out.)
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However, in some casesas in this examplerm 3s candidate CDF (i.e., when we ignore
the monotonicity constraint on the CDF) starts to decrease in p before the largest CDF
reaches 1, which cannot therefore be a valid CDF. Figure 4 illustrates this. The correct
CDF for this rm is then obtained by ironing this curve as shown on the gure, so that
the largest rm does not choose prices in the interval denoted by the dashed line, which in
this example is the interval ( 9
25
; 16
25
).18
These equilibria with ironing provide insight into the relationship between the two
seemingly contrasting parts of Proposition 5. A conguration which is well inside the
parameter space dened by (19) will have a pattern of prices as with symmetric interactions:
all three rms choose low prices, then rm 1 drops out leaving rms 2 and 3 to compete
in the range with high prices. As parameters change to approach the boundary (21), the
candidate CDF for rm 3 will start to decrease before rm 1s CDF reaches 1. In this case,
the ironing procedure is used so that rm 3s price support has a gap in the middle. As
the boundary (21) is reached, the lower price range where all three rms are active shrinks
and ultimately vanishes, leaving an equilibrium with duopolistic pricing.
The impact of entry: As an application of this analysis, consider entry by a third rm
into a duopoly market. If the three rms post-entry have symmetric interactions, then
Proposition 2 shows entry will increase consumer surplus. Beyond this case, however,
the analysis is less clear cut. Entry might induce an incumbent to retreat towards its
captive base by raising its price, thereby harming its captive customers. This is the case,
for example, when the set of consumers reached by the entrant approximately coincides
with the set reached by one of the incumbents. Then these rms will set prices p  0,
while the other incumbent chooses p  1 and almost fully exploits its captive customers.
Nevertheless, since entry of this form reduces industry prot, consumers overall will benet.
In section 4 we have already seen how nested entry, which does not a¤ect the num-
ber of captive customers in the market, might harm consumers overall. More generally,
when entry only occurs within contested segments there is a tendency for entry to harm
consumers overall. To illustrate, suppose the incumbents are symmetric and the entrant
18The CDF on Figure 4 does not reach 1 since this rm has an atom at p = 1 in equilibrium. The ironing
procedure shown in Figure 4 is also used in the (otherwise distantly related) analysis in de Clippel, Eliaz,
and Rozen (2014). Some of the asymmetric equilibria in Baye et al. (1992) also have a gap in one rms
support: two rms use the whole range [p0; 1], while the third chooses prices in a lower range [p0; p1], with
p1 < 1, but also has an atom at p = 1.
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is considered only by those consumers who already consider both incumbents, as shown
on Figure 5. This is a natural pattern of consideration if only savvy consumers consider
buying from the entrant, and these are the consumers who anyway consider both incum-
bents. In this case part (i) of Proposition 5 applies to the post-entry market (provided the
entrants reach lies strictly inside the incumbents overlap). The minimum price is equal
to an incumbents captive-to-reach ratio, which is unchanged with entry. Thus, entry of
this form leaves welfare and incumbent prot una¤ected, increases industry prot due to
the prot obtained by the entrant, and so harms consumers. In fact, it is possible that
even the consumers who consider all three rms are harmed by this form of entry, despite
being able to choose among more rms, as the higher prices o¤ered by incumbents leave
the entrant relatively free to set high prices too.
Figure 5: Entry into the contested market
This result is related to Rosenthal (1980), where entry by a new rm causes the average
price paid by both captive and informed consumers to rise. However, in his model the
entrant arrives with its own new pool of captive customers, thus raising welfare, whereas
the e¤ect arises in our scenario despite the entrant having none.19
19Relatedly, in a setting with di¤erentiated products, Chen and Riordan (2008) show how entry to a
monopoly market can induce the incumbent to raise its price. For instance, entry by generic pharmaceuti-
cals might cause a branded incumbent to raise its price, as it prefers to focus on those relatively captive
customers who care particularly about its brand. Pazgal, Soberman, and Thomadsen (2016) study a sit-
uation where two incumbents are located on a Hotelling line, and a third rm enters at a location to the
left of the left-hand incumbent. Because the left-hand incumbent has less incentive to serve consumers to
its left, it may raise its price, with the e¤ect that industry prot could rise. Closer to the consideration
set framework is Chen and Riordan (2007), who study a model with symmetric rms, where consumers
either consider a single random rm or consider a random pair of rms. Among other results, they show
that the equilibrium price can increase when an additional rm enters.
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The impact of a merger: When a market has symmetric interactions, Proposition 2 shows
that a protable merger harms consumers overall. One can show that the same is always
true when the initial market has three rms. Specically, one can show that a protable
merger between two rms necessarily increases the third rms prot. For instance, if the
non-merging rm, say rm F , used the minimum price p0 before merger, then the merger
between the other two will increase F s prot because the minimum price must rise for the
merger to be protable.20 The remaining case to consider is a merger between rms 1 and
2 under the conditions of part (ii) of Proposition 5. More detailed calculations reveal that
here too rm 3s prot rises when rms 1 and 2 merge. We deduce that any protable
3-to-2 merger is detrimental to consumers.
Figure 6: A protable merger which benets consumers
However, it is not always true, with more than three rms, that protable mergers
harm consumers. It may be, for example, that a merger between two rms with a strong
interactionwhich is therefore likely to be protablemight induce non-merging rms
to ght for the newly-protable consumer segment, with the result that overall industry
prots might fall and consumers are made better o¤. To illustrate this possibility consider
the following example, which draws from our analysis of triopoly. Figure 6 depicts the
20Before the merger, the combined prot of the merging rms, say rms A and B, was at least (A +
B)p0, and since their combined reach falls after the merger, for the merger to be protable the minimum
price must rise.
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pattern of consumer consideration. There are initially ve rms, where rms 4 and 5 reach
precisely the same set of consumers (depicted as the shaded set) and hence set price p = 0
in equilibrium.21 Firms 1, 2 and 3 each have a single captive customer, a single consumer
considers each set of rms f2; 3g, f4; 5g and f1; 4; 5g, while four consumers consider each
set of rms f1; 2g and f3; 4; 5g. (No consumers consider more than three rms.)
Since rms 4 and 5 set price zero, rms 1, 2 and 3 compete as triopolists as if the shaded
row on Figure 6 was eliminated. Here, rms 1 and 2 have the greatest interaction in this
triopoly, and Proposition 5 implies that the equilibrium involves duopolistic pricing with
rms 1 and 2 setting low prices and rms 2 and 3 setting high prices. The proof of part
(ii) of the Proposition shows that rm 3 obtains its captive prot (1 = 1), while rms
1 and 2 obtain respective prots 1 = 5p0 and 2 = 6p0, where p0 =
2
7
is the minimum
price. Since rms 4 and 5 make zero prot industry prot is 29
7
. Now suppose rms 4 and
5 merge. (Clearly this is a protable merger, as before the rms obtained no prot.) Since
the four rms are symmetrically placed, each rm now obtains its captive prot (i = 1),
in which case industry prot falls to 4 after the merger, and consumers overall are better
o¤.22 Intuitively, before the merger the market was highly asymmetric, which allowed rms
to enjoy high prots, and the merger brings more intense symmetric competition to the
market. This example shows that not all protable mergers in our setting are detrimental
to consumers, but such competition-enhancing mergers appear to be relatively rare.
6 Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to explore, in a parsimonious framework with price-setting
rms and homogeneous products, how the pattern of consumer consideration determines
the pattern of price competition.
In general, patterns of consideration were determined by rm reaches, i, and how
those reaches overlap as captured by the interaction parameters, S. We introduced a
relatively exible class of consideration patterns, which we termed symmetric interactions,
where the interaction parameters did not depend on the identity of rms in S. This class
21This violates Assumption 2. However, the same argument works if rms 4 and 5 have reaches which
nearly coincide.
22Similar analysis shows that imposing a price ceiling on one rm in a market (which is akin to de-
merging rms 4 and 5 on the gure) can cause industry prots to increase. Likewise, this example shows
that entry might increase the prot of an incumbent rm: if the market initially consisted of rms 1 to 4,
then entry by rm 5 strictly increases the prots of both rms 1 and 2.
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includes cases studied in the existing literaturesymmetric rms, independent reach, and
duopolyas particular cases. Within this class, in equilibrium all rms use the same
minimum price, which implies that prots are proportional to a rms reach. Firms choose
their prices from an interval, and rms with smaller reach choose lower average prices.
Markets within this class have intuitive properties with respect to exit and protable
merger, both of which raise the minimum price and harm consumers.
Outside the class of symmetric interactions, other pricing patterns and more novel
comparative statics can emerge. We found equilibria with duopolistic pricing patterns,
i.e., where only two rms compete in a given price range. In a market in which a chain
store competed against local rivals, the former used the full range of prices while local
rms used disjoint price ranges. With nested reach and increasing di¤erences there was an
overlapping duopoly price pattern where small rms only use low prices and large rms
only use high prices. In the three-rm case we established that if all rms do not use
the same minimum price then pricing was necessarily duopolistic. When one pair of rms
had signicantly greater interaction than other pairs, rms with a strong interaction focus
their competitive e¤orts against each other, leaving a third rm able to set high prices. For
some parameter congurations we found equilibria with a gap in one rms price support, so
that that rm sometimes prices high, and sometimes low, but never in between. We found
plausible patterns of consumer consideration in which entry is detrimental to consumers
because it softens competition between incumbents, leading them to retreat towards their
captive base. Protable mergers were shown always to be detrimental to consumers in the
three-rm case, as with symmetric interactions, but not more generally.
The analysis could be extended in a number of directions. One way would be to allow
rms to o¤er multiple brands, where they are able to charge di¤erent prices for di¤erent
brands and where consumers might consider some of its brands but not others. In this
situation it would be interesting to understand when a multi-brand rm chooses distinct
prices for its brands, and, if so, the resulting pattern of pricing within a rm. A second
extension would be to endogenise the pattern of consideration by introducing search by
consumers, word-of-mouth communication between consumers, or advertising by rms. For
instance, Butters (1977), Ireland (1993) and McAfee (1994) studied a market where rms
choose both their reach (via costly advertising) and price, under the assumption that reach
was independent. Using the analysis in this paper, one could study the same issue but with
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alternative patterns of interaction (i.e., where S 6= 1), such as when consumers di¤ered
in their attentiveness to advertising or when reach was nested rather than independent.
Alternatively, if advertising is mediated by platforms and rms pay platforms for reach,
those platforms may have an incentive to control the interactions S (e.g., to choose which
adverts are shown together) in order to stimulate or stie competition between rms.
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Technical Appendix
Sketch proof of Lemma 1: We rst discuss arguments to do with deletion of dominated
prices. In any equilibrium we have i  i, since rm i can ensure at least this prot by
choosing price equal to 1 and serving its captive customers. For this reason, no rm would
ever o¤er a price below i, its captive-to-reach ratio, since if it did so it would obtain prot
below i even if it supplied its entire reach.
To see that the minimum price p0 is positive we invoke Assumption 2. There is at least
one rm i which has captive customers, and which will not set price below i > 0. From the
remaining rms, at least one rm j has captive customers in the subset of rms excluding
i, and so this rm can set price i and be sure to obtain positive prot. Firm j therefore
also has a positive lower bound on its prices. Following the same argument, a rm in the
subset of rms excluding both i and j can obtain positive prot, and so on until the set
of rms is exhausted. In particular, each rms minimum price is strictly above zero and
hence so is p0. If rm i chooses price p0 (or just below), it will undercut all rivals and sell
to its reach, so achieving prot ip0. This proves part (ii).
If price p < 1 is in rm is support then its expected demand qi() cannot be at in a
neighbourhood of p, for otherwise the rm could obtain strictly greater prot by raising
its price above p. This implies that this price must be in the support of at least one other
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rm. More precisely, if price p < 1 is in rm is support then i must compete against some
other rm j at this price.
We next turn to arguments concerning the possibility of atoms in the price distrib-
utions. First observe that two rms cannot both have an atom at price p if they compete
at this price (for otherwise each would have an incentive to undercut the price p and gain
a discrete jump in demand).
To see that each rms price distribution is continuous in the interval [p0; 1), suppose
by contrast that rm i has an atom at some price 0 < p < 1 in its support. We claim that
rms i demand qi() must then be locally at above p. As noted above, there cannot be
another rm which competes with i at price p which also has an atom at p, and so qi does
not jump down discretely at p. In addition, any rm which competes with i at p obtains
a discrete increase in demand if it slightly undercuts p, and so such a rm would never
choose a price immediately above p. Since there is no rm which competes with i at prices
immediately above p, rm i loses no demand if it raises its price slightly above p, which is
not compatible with p maximizing the rms prot. Therefore, rm i cannot have an atom
at p < 1, and this completes the proof of part (iii). This implies that each rms demand
qi(p) is continuous in the interval [p0; 1).
Similarly, if p0 is the minimum price ever chosen in the market, then all prices in the
interval [p0; 1] are sometimes chosen. If p is in rm is support but no rm is active in an
interval (p; p0) above p, then rm i has at demand over the range (p; p0), and this cannot
occur in equilibrium. This completes the proof of part (iv).
Suppose now that there are at least three rms. Let Pij denote the set of prices in
[p0; 1] which are in the supports of both rm i and rm j, which is a closed set. Part (iv)
implies that the collection fPijg covers the interval [p0; 1], and since each rm participates,
at least two of the sets in fPijg are non-empty. If there were no price in the support of
three or more rms then the collection fPijg would consist of disjoint sets. However, since
[p0; 1] is connected it cannot be covered by two or more disjoint closed sets, and we deduce
that at least two sets in fPijg must overlap, which proves part (v).
Firms can have an atom at the reservation price p = 1. However, as noted above, if
rm i has an atom at p = 1 then no potential competitor can also have an atom at 1,
which implies that when rm i chooses p = 1 it sells only to its captive customers and so
its prot is precisely i = i. If no rm has an atom at p = 1 then any rm with p = 1
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in its support (and there must be at two such rms from part (iv)) has prot equal to i.
This completes the proof for part (i).
Let rm j be a rm which obtains prot equal to j. Then the minimum price ever
chosen, p0, must be no higher than j (for otherwise rm j could obtain more prot by
choosing p = p0), and so p0 cannot exceed the highest i. Since no rm sets a price below
its i, the minimum price p0 (which from part (iv) is sometimes chosen by at least two
rms) must be weakly above the second lowest i. Finally, if the rm with the highest i
has p0 in its support, then p0 cannot be strictly lower than this highest i, and so must
equal this highest i. This completes the proof for part (vi).
Proof of Lemma 2: Consider rm is demand in (2), which can be expressed as
qi(p)
i
=
qi=j(p)
i
 Gj(p)
qij(p)
ij
: (22)
Note that the demand expression qi=j in (3) can be written in terms of the interaction
parameters as
qi=j(p)
i
=
X
Sji;j =2S
( 1)jSjS[i (k2SGk(p)) : (23)
Because the interactions are symmetric, S[i = S[j for each set S which excludes i and
j, and so qi=j(p)=i = qj=i(p)=j. Expression (22) therefore implies (11).
Firm is captive-to-reach ratio is i=i = (i + ij)=i   ij=i. Similarly to (23) we
have
i + ij
i
=
X
Sji;j =2S
( 1)jSjS[i (k2Sk) =
X
Sji;j =2S
( 1)jSjS[j (k2Sk) =
j + ij
j
;
and (12) follows.
Proof of Proposition 1: The argument in the main text proves that all rms use the same
minimum price p0. Firm is prot is therefore ip0, and if price p is also in its support then
qi(p)=i = p0=p. Therefore, expression (11) implies that if both rm i and rm j have p in
their support then Gi(p) = Gj(p) in equilibrium.
We claim that this implies that no rm can have a gap in its price support, so that
rm is support takes the form [p0; pi] for some maximum price pi. For if not, there is at
least one rm with a gap, and let rm i be the rm with a gap which starts at the lowest
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price, say a, and where b > a is the next price in rm is support. Therefore, rm i does
not use prices in the interval (a; b) and so Gi(a) = Gi(b). If a rm is not active at price a, it
will never use a higher price, and so any rm which is active at b must also be active at a.
Part (iv) of Lemma 1 implies that at least two rms are active at any price in (a; b), and in
particular, some rm, say j, which is active at b must also be active at prices immediately
below b as well (as well as being active at a). Therefore, for this rm Gj(b) > Gj(a), which
contradicts Gi(a) = Gi(b) given that both i and j are active at both a and b.
Since no rm has a gap, the price support of rm i takes the form [p0; pi]. Since
Gi(pi)  i, if pi > pj then both i and j are active at pj and so i > Gi(pj) = Gj(pj) = j
and rms with a higher maximum price must have a larger reach, and so with the given
labelling of rms we have p1  :::  pn. Since at least two rms must be active at p = 1 we
have pn 1 = pn = 1 as claimed. Finally, we show stochastic dominance in price strategies.
For p 2 [p0; p1] all rms have price p in their support. Therefore, G1(p) = ::: = Gn(p) and
so F1(p)  :::  Fn(p). For p 2 [pi 1; pi], rms j < i have Fj(p) = 1 while rms j  i have
p in their support. Therefore, Gi(p) = ::: = Gn(p), and so again F1(p)  :::  Fn(p) as
claimed.
Proof of Proposition 2: First observe that when n = 2, exit or merger leaves a monopoly
and so consumer obtain zero surplus and the result holds trivially. Therefore, in the
following suppose n  3.
(i) Welfare is the total fraction of consumers reached by any rm, which falls by i
when rm i exits. Consumer surplus is welfare minus industry prot. Suppose that before
exit the rm with the largest reach is labelled n, in which case industry prot is n(ii).
Suppose rst that the rm which exits is not the largest, so i 6= n. Then the minimum
price increases from n=n to (n + in)=n, and the change in consumer surplus as a
result of exit is
 i +
n
n
 X
j
j
!
 
n + in
n
 X
j 6=i
j
!
=  
in
n
 X
j 6=n
j
!
< 0 ;
where the equality follows from (12). If instead it is the largest rm, rm n, which exits,
expression (12) implies that all remaining rms have captive-to-reach ratio which is greater
than n=n, and so again the minimum price rises after exit. Since rm ns prot was n,
which was its contribution to welfare, the change in consumer surplus is the opposite to the
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change in the remaining rms prot, and the latter is positive since the minimum price
rises. This completes the proof for part (i).
(ii) Before the merger all rms used the same minimum price, p0. Suppose two rms, i
and j, merge to form rm M , and the new minimum price in the market is p^0. The reach
of rm M is M = i + j   ij, which is less than the sum of the reaches of i and j.
We will show that p^0 > p0, which in turn implies that the impact of the merger on the
prots of the non-merging rms must be positive (since the prot of a non-merging rm k
is at least kp^0, which exceeds its pre-merger prot). Therefore, if the merger is protable,
industry prots rise and consumers are harmed.
Since the post-merger market need not exhibit symmetric interactions, it may be that
only a subset of rms have p^0 in their price support. First suppose that rm M uses the
minimum price p^0 and hence obtains prot M p^0. Since M < i + j, in order for the
merger to be protable it must be that p^0 > p0 as claimed.
Next suppose that rm M does not use the minimum price p^0, and its minimum price
is P > p^0. The demand function of the merged rm is qM(p) = qi=j(p) + qj=i(p)   qij(p).
Let rm k be a non-merging rm which does price at p0. A similar argument to that used
to derive (11) shows that
qi=j(P )
i
 
qk(P )
k
=
qi=j(P )
i
 
qk=j(P )
k
= qik=j(P )[
FM(P )
k
 
Fk(P )
i
] < 0 :
Here, the rst equality follows since P is the minimum price charged by the merged rm,
and so rm ks demand at P is the same as if j was absent, while the second equality
follows since the market without j continues to have symmetric interactions, and so the
appropriate adjustment of (11) applies. (The function qik=j is the demand from consumers
who consider both i and k in the market absent j.) The nal inequality follows since P
is the merged rms minimum price, so FM(P ) = 0 < Fk(P ). The same argument for qj=i
shows that qj=i(P )=j < qk(P )=k.
Therefore,
p0(i + j)  PqM(P )  P [qi=j(P ) + qj=i(P )] <
P
k
qk(P )(i + j)  p^0(i + j) ;
and hence p0 < p^0 as claimed. Here, the rst inequality follows since post-prot, PqM(P ),
is not below the pre-merger combined prot, and the nal inequality follows since rm k
weakly prefers the price p^0 to P in the post-merger market.
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Proof of Proposition 4: (i) No rm will ever choose a price strictly above the maximum
price used by a larger rm, for it will then be undercut by the larger rm and so have no
demand or prot. Therefore, H1  :::  Hn. Since at least two rms use the price p = 1,
we have Hn 1 = Hn = 1. (Firm n must have an atom at p = 1 for otherwise rm n   1
would have zero prot when its chooses price 1. Firm n   1 cannot also have an atom
at p = 1 for otherwise these rms have an incentive to undercut each other.) Since price
distributions are continuous, if rm i < n   1 choose the price Hi+1 it will also have zero
demand and prot, and so the inequality is strict for all rms except the largest two.
Turning to the minimum prices Li, assume for contradiction that Li+1 < Li for some
i < n. Dene A(p)  k>i+1(1  Fk(p)) as the probability that all rms larger than i + 1
price above p. (As usual, if i + 1 = n then set A(p)  1.) As a preliminary point, note
that for all p, the ratio
qi(p)
A(p)(1  Fi+1(p))
= [i + i 1(1  Fi 1(p)) + i 2(1  Fi 1(p))(1  Fi 2(p)) + :::]
is weakly decreasing in p. In particular, since Fi+1(Li+1) = 0 < Fi+1(Li)
qi(Li+1)
A(Li+1)

qi(Li)
A(Li)(1  Fi+1(Li))
>
qi(Li)
A(Li)
: (24)
By revealed preference
Liqi(Li)  Li+1qi(Li+1) (25)
and
Li+1qi+1(Li+1) = Li+1[i+1A(Li+1) + qi(Li+1)]
 Liqi+1(Li) = Li

i+1A(Li) +
qi(Li)
1  Fi+1(Li)

> Li[i+1A(Li) + qi(Li)] ; (26)
since Fi+1(Li) > 0. From (25) and (26) we have
Li+1A(Li+1) > LiA(Li) : (27)
But multiplying each side of (24) by the corresponding side of (27) implies that
Li+1qi(Li+1) > Liqi(Li)
contrary to (25). We deduce that minimum prices Li weakly increase with i.
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To show that Hi > Li+1, note rst that if Hi < Li+1 then because Lj and Hj increase
with j there is an interval of prices (Hi; Li+1) used by no rm, which is contrary to Lemma
1. If Hi = Li+1, Lemma 1 shows that at least one rm k other than i uses prices just below
Hi. Since Lj increases with j we must have k < i. But since i < n has no atom at p = Hi,
rm k will almost surely be undercut by i when it uses p  Hi in which case it makes zero
prot (contrary to Lemma 1). We deduce that Hi > Li+1.
(ii) If exactly k  3 rms use the minimum price p0, part (i) above shows that these
will be the rms i = 1; :::; k. Following the same argument as at the start of section 4,
q0i(p0)=i =  1=p0 for each rm i  k. From (6), this entails
P
j2f1;:::;kg=i ijG
0
j(p0) = 1=p0
for each i  k. By Farkass Lemma, this system of linear equations has no solution with
each G0i(p0)  0 if and only if there exists a vector (x1; :::xk) satisfying
kX
j=1
xj < 0 and
X
j2f1;:::;kg=i
ijxj  0 for each i  k : (28)
With nested reach we have ij = 1=maxfi; jg. Let x1 = x2 = 1, x3 = ::: = xn 1 =
0 and xn =  (2 + "), which has a negative sum. Then we have
P
j2f1;:::;kg=1 1jxj =P
j2f1;:::;kg=2 2jxj =
1
2
  2+"
k
, for 2 < i < n we have
P
j2f1;:::;kg=i ijxj =
2
i
  2+"
k
, and nallyP
j2f1;:::;kg=k jkxj =
2
k
. If k > 22 then each of these terms is positive for su¢ciently
small " > 0, and so (28) holds. Therefore, if k > 22 it is not possible that k rms use
the minimum price. Moreover, if ~k > k then ~k > 22 and so it is also impossible to have
larger number of rms using the minimum price.
(iii) We construct an equilibrium of the stated form. The prot of the largest rm n
is n = n, its number of captive customers, and denote the prot of smaller rms by i.
In the highest interval [pn 1; 1] used by the two largest rms, these rms are sure to be
undercut by all smaller rivals, and so in this range their CDFs must satisfy
n + n 1(1  Fn 1(p)) =
n
p
; n 1(1  Fn(p)) =
n 1
p
:
Since Fn(pn 1) = 0 it follows that pn 1 and n 1 are related as n 1 = n 1pn 1. We have
Fn 1(1) = 1, while the largest rm has an atom at p = 1 with probability 1   Fn(1) =
n 1=n 1 = pn 1.
In the lowest interval [p1; p2] used by the two smallest rms, these rms are sure to
undercut all larger rivals, and so in this range their CDFs must satisfy
2 + 1(1  F1(p)) =
2
p
; 1(1  F2(p)) =
1
p
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and since F1(p1) = F2(p1) = 0 it follows that
1 = 1p1 ; 2 = (1 + 2)p1 :
Since F1(p2) = 1 we have 2 = 2p2, which combined with the previous expression for 2
implies that
p2 =
1 + 2
2
p1 : (29)
If there are just three rms, these are the two price intervals in the equilibrium. With
more than three rms there are intermediate intervals, and in the interval [pi; pi+1], where
1 < i < n   1, rms i and i + 1 are active and will be undercut by smaller rivals and
undercut their larger rivals. Therefore, in this range their CDFs must satisfy
i+1 + i(1  Fi(p)) =
i+1
p
; i(1  Fi+1(p)) =
i
p
: (30)
Since Fi+1(pi) = 0 it follows that i = ipi.
An intermediate rm i, where 2  i  n   1, is active in both the intervals [pi 1; pi]
and [pi; pi+1], and its CDF Fi needs to be continuous across the threshold price pi. At the
price pi we therefore require that
i 1
i 1pi
= 1  Fi(pi) =
1
i

i+1
pi
  i+1

; (31)
where in the case of i = 2 we have written 1 = 1. If we write pn = 1 then we have
i = ipi for all rms 1  i  n, and so for 2  i  n 1 expression (31) entails expression
(15). This is a second-order di¤erence equation in pi where p1 is free, p2 is given in (29),
and the terminal condition pn = 1 serves to pin down p1. It is clear from (29) and (15)
that the sequence p1; p2; p3; ::: is an increasing sequence of price thresholds. This completes
the description of the candidate equilibrium.
We next show that rms have no incentive to deviate from these strategies. By construc-
tion, rm i is indi¤erent between choosing any price in the interval [pi 1; pi+1], assuming
its rivals follow the stated strategies. We need to check that a rms prot is no higher
if it chooses a price outside this interval. Consider rst an upward price deviation, which
is only relevant if i < n   1. If i < n   2 and rm i chooses a price above pi+2 is has no
demand since rm i + 1 is sure to set a lower price and all rm is potential customers
also consider rm (i + 1)s price. Suppose then that i < n   1 and rm i chooses a price
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p 2 [pi+1; pi+2], in which case it has demand i if its price is below the prices of both rivals
i+ 1 and i+ 2. Therefore, from (30) its prot with such a price is
pi[1  Fi+1(p)][1  Fi+2(p)] =
ii+1
2i+1

i+2
p
  i+2

= pi+1
ii+2
i+1

pi+2
p
  1

:
This prot decreases from i = ipi at p = pi+1 to zero at p = pi+2. We deduce that rm
i cannot increase its prot by choosing a price above pi+1.
Next consider a downward price deviation, so that rm i chooses a price below pi 1
(which is only relevant when i > 2). Suppose that this rm chooses a price in the interval
[pj; pj+1], where j  i  2. The rm will undercut all rms larger than rm j + 1, and so
obtain demand at least j+2 + ::: + i. It will also serve the segment j+1 if it undercuts
rm j + 1 and it will additionally serve the segment j if it undercuts both rms j and
j + 1. Putting this together implies that the rms prot with price p 2 [pj; pj+1] is
p

j+2 + :::+ i + (1  Fj+1(p))(j+1 + j(1  Fj(p))
	
: (32)
Given the CDFs in (30), this prot is a convex function of p and so must be maximized in
this range either at pj or at pj+1. Therefore, we can restrict our attention to deviations by
rm i > 2 to the threshold prices fp1; p2; :::; pi 2g. If it chooses price pj where 2  j  i 2,
expression (32) implies its prot is pj

j+1 + :::+ i + j(1  Fj(pj))
	
. Expression (31)
implies that j(1   Fj(pj)) is equal to j+1(
pj+1
pj
  1), in which case the above deviation
prot with price pj is
pj

j+1 + :::+ i + j+1(
pj+1
pj
  1)

= j+1pj+1 + (j+2 + :::+ i)pj : (33)
One can check that expression (33) holds also for j = 1. We need to show that (33) is no
higher than rm is equilibrium prot, which is i = ipi. We do this in two steps: (i) we
show that (33) is increasing in j given i, so that j = i   2 is the most tempting of these
deviations for rm i, and (ii) we show (33) is below ipi when j = i  2.
To show (i), suppose that i  4, which is the only relevant case, and suppose that
1  j  i  3. Then rm is deviation prot with price pj+1 from (33) is
j+2pj+2 + (j+3 + :::+ i)pj+1 = j+1pj + j+2pj+1 + (j+3 + :::+ i)pj+1
 j+1pj + j+2pj+1 + (j+3 + :::+ i)pj+1   (j+2   j+1)(pj+1   pj)
= j+1pj+1 + j+2pj + (j+3 + :::+ i)pj+1  j+1pj+1 + (j+2 + :::+ i)pj
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where the nal expression is the rms deviation prot with price pj, which proves claim
(i). (Here, the rst equality follows from (15), the rst inequality follows from (14) and
the fact that fpjg is an increasing sequence, while the nal inequality follows from fpjg
being an increasing sequence.)
To show claim (ii), suppose that i  3 which is the only relevant case, and observe that
ipi = i 1pi 2 + ipi 1
 i 1pi 2 + ipi 1   (i   i 1)(pi 1   pi 2)
= i 1pi 1 + ipi 2
where the nal expression is (33) when j = i   2. (Here, the rst equality follows from
(15) and the inequality follows from fig being an increasing sequence.) This completes
the proof that the stated strategies constitute an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5: Part (i) was demonstrated in the main text, so suppose now that
(20) is satised. Lemma 1 shows that there is at least one price in all three price supports,
and let L and H denote respectively the lowest and highest price among the prices in all
three supports. (The set of prices in all three supports is closed.) If condition (20) holds
we will show that L = H so there is only one price in all three supports.
Suppose by contradiction that we have H > L. Either all three rms have the same
minimum price p0 (i.e., L = p0) or only two rms do, and in the latter case the proof for
part (i) shows that it must be rms 1 and 2 which price low. In either case rms 1 and 2
use p0, and in either case we have G1(L) = G2(L) =   0. Let g = maxfG1(H); G2(H)g.
Since we cannot have only one rm active in the open interval (L;H), one or both of 1
and 2 must choose prices in (L;H), and so  < g.
Firms 1 and 2 obtain respective prots p01 and p02, and let 3  p3 denote rm 3s
prot. Expression (10) shows that a price p in rm 3s support satises
3
3p
= 1  13G1(p)  23G2(p) + G1(p)G2(p) ;
and setting p = L;H in the above and subtracting implies that
3
3

1
L
 
1
H

= 13G1(H) + 23G2(H)  G1(H)G2(H)
 13G1(L)  23G2(L) + G1(L)G2(L)
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 13g + 23g   g
2   13   23 + 
2
= (g   )(13 + 23   (g + )) : (34)
Here, the inequality follows since 13  G2(H) and 23  G1(H), and so the initial
expression is weakly increased if we replaceG1(H) andG2(H) by g = maxfG1(H); G2(H)g.
Likewise, and using that fact that G3(L) = 0, for rm j = 1; 2 we have
p0

1
L
 
1
H

= 12Gi(H) + j3G3(H)  G3(H)Gi(H)  12Gi(L)
 12g + j3G3(H)  gG3(H)  12
 (g   )12 :
Since 3  3p0 and g    > 0, it follows that
(g + )  13 + 23   12 : (35)
If  = 0 this inequality contradicts (20), so we deduce that it is not possible to have H > L
when (20) holds and  = 0. Therefore, suppose henceforth that  > 0. Then since g > 0
the inequality (35) contradicts the rst inequality in (17) which holds whenever L > p0.
We deduce that if H > L then all three rms use the same minimum price p0.
We show next that if all three rms use the same minimum price, then (20) cannot
hold. Suppose that all three rms use p0 and that H is the highest price in all three price
supports. Then q1(H)
1
= q2(H)
2
= q3(H)
3
and (16) implies
(12   23)G2(H) + (13   G2(H))(G3(H) G1(H)) = 0 ; (36)
(12   13)G1(H) + (23   G1(H))(G3(H) G2(H)) = 0 : (37)
Condition (20) implies that 12 > maxf13; 23g, and so these expressions imply that
G3(H) < minfG1(H); G2(H)g and also that the terms (13 G2(H)) and (23 G1(H))
are strictly positive. At least one of the Gi(H) must equal i.
Suppose G1(H) = 1. If 1  G2(H) then (37) implies that G3(H) has the sign of
(23   1)G2(H)  (12   13)1  (23   1)1   (12   13)1 < 0 ;
where the nal strict inequality follows from (20). Since G3 cannot be negative, this is not
possible. Likewise, if 1  G2(H) then (36) implies that G3(H) has the sign
(13   G2(H))1   (12   23)G2(H)  (13   1)1   (12   23)1 < 0 :
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Therefore, G1(H) < 1. If instead G2(H) = 2 then we must have G1(H)  2. Then
(36) again implies that G3(H) < 0. We conclude that G3(H) = 3.
If H = 1 then both rms 1 and 2 have an atom at p = 1, which requires 12 = 0.
However, if 12 = 0 then 12 = 3 and so (20) implies that (1 + 3) > 13 + 23 
(1 + 2), and so 3  2, which contradicts the previous condition 3 = G3(H) <
minfG1(H); G2(H)g. Therefore, we deduce that H < 1.
Since only rms 1 and 2 are active above price H, we must have 12 > 0 and so
12 > 3. Expression (16) with k = 3 then implies that (G1(p)   G2(p)) is constant
for p 2 [H; 1], so that G1(1)   G1(H) = G2(1)   G2(H)   > 0. For k 6= 3 we have
kp0 = Hqk(H) = qk(1) and hence
p0

1
H
  1

=
qk(H)  qk(1)
k
= (12   3) ; (38)
whereas 3p0 = Hq3(H)  q3(1) and so
p0

1
H
  1


q3(H)  q3(1)
3
= (13 + 23)   [G1(1)G2(1) G1(H)G2(H)]
= [(13 + 23)  (G1(H) +G2(H) + )] :
With (38) this implies
12   13   23  [3   (G1(H) +G2(H) + )]
<  (Gk(H) + ) =  Gk(1)
for k = 1; 2. (Here, the strict inequality follows since 3 = G3(H) < minfG1(H); G2(H)g.)
As 1 and 2 cannot both have atoms at p = 1, Gk(1) = k  1 for some k, and (20) is
contradicted.
In sum, we have shown that when (20) holds, there is only one price in the support
of all three rms, say p1, which strictly exceeds p0, and only rms 1 and 2 are active in
the range [p0; p1). If p1 = 1 then the proof is complete. If p1 < 1 then only two rms are
active in this range, one of which is rm 3. The remaining issue is which of rms 1 and 2
is the other rm active above p1. Expression (16) implies that 1F1(p) = 2F2(p) in the
range [p0; p1]. If 1 = 2 then F1 = F2, and so one of these rms cannot drop out before
the other and we must have p1 = 1. If 2 > 1 then in the range [p0; p1] we have F2 > F1
and so it is rm 1 which drops out rst.
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The nal step in the proof is to determine the prots of the three rms, as well as the
price thresholds p0 and p1. Since rms 1 and 2 have p0 as their minimum price in this
equilibrium, their prots are 1 = 1p0 and 2 = 2p0. In the range [p0; p1] their adjusted
CDFs are given by
12Gj(p) = 1 
p0
p
;
and rm 1 drops out at price p1, so that the ratio p0=p1 satises
121 = 1 
p0
p1
(39)
and so
G2(p1) = 1 : (40)
Either rm 2 or 3 (or both) obtains exactly its captive prot.23 Suppose rst that rm
3 obtains its captive prot, so that 3 = 3. For prices in the upper range [p1; 1] only rms
2 and 3 compete and are sure to be undercut by rm 1, so from (10) rm 2s CDF satises
1  131   23G2 + 1G2 =
3
p
;
where recall that 3 is rm 3s captive-to-reach ratio. In order for G2() to be continuous
at the threshold price p1, (40) implies that
1  131   231 + 
2
1 =
3
p1
;
which determines p1. Expression (39) in turn implies that
p0 = p1(1  121) =
3(1  121)
1  131   231 + 
2
1
: (41)
It is convenient to write P for the right-hand side above, so that
P =
3(1  121)
1  131   231 + 
2
1
=
3(2 + 23)
32 + 23(2   1)
; (42)
where the second equality follows by routine manipulation. Note from the rst expression
for P above that the condition P < 3 corresponds to (20). Expression (41) implies
p1 =
32
32 + 23(2   1)
: (43)
23If one of these rms has no atom at p = 1 then the other obtains its captive prot when it chooses
p = 1. If both have an atom at p = 1 then for neither to have an incentive to undercut the other we must
have 23 = 0, in which case both rms obtain their captive prot at p = 1.
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Alternatively, suppose rm 2 obtains its captive prot, so that 2 = 2. Since the rm
has p0 as its lowest price it follows that
p0 = 2 : (44)
Expression (39) then implies that
p1 =
2
2 + 23
: (45)
For prices in the upper range [p1; 1] rm 2s CDF now satises
1  131   23G2 + 1G2 =
3
3p
;
where 3 is rm 3s prot. For G2 to be continuous at p1 = 2=(2 + 23), (40) implies
1  131   231 + 
2
1 =
2 + 23
2

3
3
;
which determines 3. This can be expressed as
3 =
32
P
(46)
where P is given in (42).
Finally, we determine when it is that rm 2 or rm 3 obtains its captive prot. When
rm 3 obtains its captive prot, rm 2s minimum price is P in (42), which must be no
lower than 2 if rm 2 is willing to o¤er this price. Therefore, if P < 2 the equilibrium
must instead have rm 2 obtaining its captive prot, in which case the threshold prices
and rm 3s prot are given respectively by (44), (45) and (46). Conversely, when rm 2
obtains its captive prot, rm 3s prot is given in (46). This prot cannot be below its
captive prot 3, which therefore requires P  2. Therefore, if P > 2 the equilibrium
must involve rm 3 obtaining its captive prot, so 3 = 3, and the threshold prices p0 and
p1 are given respectively by (42) and (43). Finally, in the knife-edge case where P = 2 the
two equilibria coincide, and rms 2 and 3 each obtain their captive prot. This completes
the proof.
Details for the nested example in section 5: Recall that the example for Figure 4 has nested
reach with 1 =
1
2
, 2 =
4
5
and 3 = 1. Then part (i) of Proposition 5 applies, and all
rms use the same minimum price p0 =
1
5
and have prots ip0. In this example we have
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13 = 23 = 1 and 12 =  =
5
4
, and so expression (10) implies that for any price in the
support of all three rms we have
1 
5
4
G2  G3 +
5
4
G2G3 = 1 
5
4
G1  G3 +
5
4
G1G3 = 1 G1  G2 +
5
4
G1G2 =
1
5p
: (47)
These simultaneous equations can be solved to give
G1(p) = G2(p) =
4
5
 
2
5
r
1  p
p
; G3(p) = 1 
2
5
s
1
p(1  p)
: (48)
Here, each Gi is zero at p = p0 and G1 and G2 increase with p for prices above p0.
A candidate solution is that all three rms choose prices in the range [p0; p1], then rm
1 drops out leaving rms 2 and 3 active in the range [p1; 1]. Here F1 reaches 1, i.e., G1
reaches 1 =
1
2
, at p1 =
16
25
. For prices above p1 rms 2 and 3 compete alone, with rm 1
sure to undercut them, in which case the required adjusted CDFs in (47) are given by
G2(p) =
4
3
 
8
15p
; G3(p) = 1 
8
15p
:
The problem with this candidate solution, however, is that G3 (= F3) in (48) increases
with p only for prices below 1
2
, and thereafter it decreases with p as depicted as the solid
curve on Figure 4. The correct solution is then obtained by ironing this CDF as shown
as the dashed line on the gure so that F3 is attened to be no greater than the level
F3(p1) =
1
6
for prices below p1. The smaller root of G3 =
1
6
in (48) is p^ = 9
25
.
In this example, all three rms are active in the price range [1
5
; 9
25
], only rms 1 and
2 are active in the interior range [ 9
25
; 16
25
], and then only rms 2 and 3 are active in the
range [16
25
; 1]. In the interior range [ 9
25
; 16
25
], the adjusted CDFs G1 and G2 need modifying
from (48) to reect that they will be undercut by rm 3 with the constant probability
F3(p1) =
1
6
in this range (in which case they have no demand), so that
G1(p) = G2(p) =
4
5
 
24
125p
:
(Again, G1 reaches 1 =
1
2
at p1 =
15
25
.) With these CDFs, one can check that rm 3 does
not gain by choosing a price in the interior range [ 9
25
; 16
25
], and that rm 1 has no incentive
to choose a price above p1 =
16
25
, so that this is indeed an equilibrium.
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